Berkeley, God, and the Existence of Matter
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In the Three DialoguesbetweenHy/as and Philonous,
George Berkeley argues that physical matter, external to our
minds, does not exist. The objects that we perceive are physical
objects, insofar as we perceive them, but they do not exist in the
absence of perception. Physical objects are only intricate ideas
of perception; i.e., they are not actual objects of matter, they
way we ordinarily think of them. When one is aware of an
object, one is only immediately aware of its sensible properties.
One cannot know anything about an object that is not gotten at
without a faculty of perception, nor can one make any claim
about an object that is not based on its perceived qualities.
Therefore, objects are simply ideas that have been composed by
my perceptions of it; matter is inconceivable. It follows from
this argument that if there are no actual objects of matter in the
world they cannot be causing our perceptions of them.

If this is true, Locke is incorrect to believe that what we
perceive are actual objects and that they produce their sensible
qualities. According to Locke, the properties of an object (its
color, figure, extension, etc.) are properties that belong to it.
They are not solely properties of our ideas and perceptions
alone; rather, they create our ideas and perceptions.
But Berkeley, an idealist, believes that matter is
unintelligible. He also claims in The Dialoguesthat humans are
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not, consciously, active participants in sense perception. When I
open my eyes and move them around, I am not seeing, but
rather I am only looking. Seeing is something consequent to
the physical act of looking. 1 I do not have a choice of what I
see when I open my eyes. Similarly, when I inhale through my
nose while there is a rose beneath it, I am not actively smelling,
only taking in air. The smell of the rose is only passively
received by my mind consequent to the act. Thus, humans are
not knowingly participating in any of their seme perceptions.

If the mind does not actively perceive ideas of sense,
then it does not actively perceive anything at all in the world
external to the mind. Objects, as ideas of sense, cannot be
producing our perceptions of them either since they, in fact, are
dependent on a mind and faculties of sense. Therefore,
Berkeley is compelled to determine what or who is the active
participant in human sense perception: why is it that we perceive
what we perceive? His answer promotes God as the active
participant.

The existence of things is dependent on them

existing in His mind. Therefore, the sensible ideas that humans
have of objects in the external world are God's ideas presented
to us for our perception.
1

Phy i al movem nts of th body po e a s rious problem for
Berkel y. If phy i al object , ar only collection of s n ible
qualities , I cannot physically affect them i. ., I cannot really mov
them. Th qu tion, th n is: do we mov parts of our bodie ·?
Arms and 1 g , like other physical obj ts are simply coll ction of
id as. Does God maintain our extremiti
in the am way that
ther obj cts ar maintain cl? If o then we ar not moving our
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Berkeley does not, however, assume this relationship
because of the standard beliefs about God.
Men commonly believe that all things are known
or perceived by God because they believe the
being of a God, whereas I, on the other side,
immediately and necessarily conclude the being
of a God because all sensible things must be
perceived by him (Berkeley 135).
So it seems that the existence of God is concluded because he is
a necessary element in Berkeley's philosophy on the existence,
or nonexistence, of matter. Berkeley is suggesting that God
presents humans with things that we are inclined to believe are
objects of matter, but that are only ideas in His mind.
However, if it is true that most humans have this inclination to
believe that the cause of sense experience is the existence of
actual things, but that such an inclination is wrong, then it may
be argued that God is deceiving most humans (Field 244). In
his proof for the existence of matter, Descartes discusses the
argument that God would be deceiving us if he were the cause
of our ideas of sense, not the objects themselves. Descartes
states:
But, since God is no deceiver, it is very manifest
that He does not communicate to me these
ideas immediately and by Himself. ... For since
He has given me no faculty to recognize that
this is the case, but, on the other hand, a very
great inclination to believe... that they are
conveyed to me by corporeal objects, I do not
arms and leg , but God is. This po sibility seem
to common
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see how He could be defended from the
accusation of deceit if these ideas were produced
by causes other than corporeal objects (Field
144). 2

If we accept Descartes' argument that it is contrary to the
nature of God that he would deceive mankind, making it
impossible for God to be the cause of our sense experience, and
also accept Berkeley's argument that matter does not exist, then
there must be some other thing or being that is that cause of
sense experience.
I mentioned before that humans, as Berkeley argued,
were not consciously active in their perception of sensible
qualities. It seems possible, however, that humans are
unconsciously causing the ideas of sense that they experience.
The phenomena of dreams, in fact, can be said to be testimony
to the possibility that the mind subconsciously maintains
objects of sense. In dreams, the mind creates the 'external
world' as well as the sense perceptions that occur. Humans do,
it seems, indeed experience sensible ideas while dreaming. All
of the faculties of our senses are functioning in dreams in a way
that is identical to the way that our faculties of sense
2

D scarte us s the argument that God cannot b a d ceiver as a
premis to his larg r claim that matter mu t xist. While it i not
om thing that I will b discu in° , Descartes ' proof of matter doe
not addres · th facts that B rkeley sugge t in d fen e of his claim
which how that th only things immediate to our perc ption are
ense idea ; i.e. , w can have no know! dge of objects that is
independent of our sen ible id a of them. De cartes did his work
b fore the time of Berkeley , but no part of hi argument preclude
th po sibility of Berk ley ' .
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consciously operate. Objects appear in dreams as occupying
physical space in the same way that they do in conscious states.
Indeed, things in dreams seem just as real as things in the
external world. Similarly, everything that we perceive or know
of those things in the world of dreams is attained only through
our senses. We know nothing of the 'external' world of our
dreams that is gotten at without our senses of sight, smell,
touch, taste, or hearing. Thus, sensible ideas in dreams are just
as mind-dependent as the sensible ideas perceived in conscious
states. Furthermore, the mind, through dreams, demonstrates
the ability make sensible qualities available to my perception.
In dreams, I am the active participant.

I create the

external world and all of the sensible qualities of it. Therefore,
it appears that, although I am passive in my conscious
perceptions, I may also be subconsciously active. The same
subconscious forces that create the collection of sensible
qualities that I perceive while I am dreaming may be the cause
of the sensible properties in the external world. The forces at
work during dreams suggest the possibility that "ordinary
perceptions of things [are] 'a kind of waking dream' (RamPrasad 227)."

If it is possible that the subconscious operations of my
mind are cause of my perception, then both Descartes' and
Berkeley's requirements may be satisfied. If matter does not
exist, which, according to Berkeley, it cannot, there must be
something that replaces matter as the cause of ideas of sense.
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Berkeley wishes to place God into this role. Yet, if it were the
actions of God that caused us to perceive the ideas of sense, he
would be deceiving us, according to Descartes, because of our
inclination to believe that matter does actually exist. Without
being able to "conclude the being of God," Berkeley's
philosophy is left with a huge void. However, while God is not
capable of deceiving humans, humans are. Humans often
create ideas of sense in dreams and could be using this same
creative force during conscious states without being aware of it;
thus, deceiving themselves.
This possibility, however, runs into the problem of how
humans perceive the same objects of sense at the same time. If
we are creating sense ideas for our own perception it would
often entail the cooperation of two or more individuals in
creating collections of sense ideas available to all. Some might
object that it is impossible for our minds to create sensible ideas
because such ideas would end up being different for each
individual perceiver; our claims about what existed in the
external world would not be consistent from individual to
individual. If this were true, it might be argued that individuals
would constantly be disagreeing about what they perceive
because their own minds would be producing different objects
of sense. This disagreement between individual minds would
not, however, produce the confusion that it would at first seem
to. Rather, it is quite often that an individual human mind will
perceive the sensible qualities of a certain object in a way that is
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different from another mind. To use a classic example, my
girlfriend perceives certain sensible qualities of color that allow
her to make judgments about style and color coordination that
I simply do not. In a more hypothetical sense, it is possible
that, through the use of language, humans have come to use
certain words to identify sense objects that are nonetheless
perceived differently from person to person. For example, the
color that I call blue may actually appear to my girlfriend as the
color that I call red (which might explain problems with color
coordination).

This is not to say that if another person and I

agree that the teacher is sitting at a desk, then I might see a
table-like structure and my companion sees what I might call an
airplane. There is some similarity among human minds that
seems to be generated from their common existence as human
minds. Human minds will perceive things, even if they are
things produced independently, in similar ways to other human
minds. Dogs, for example, might perceive the desk as an
airplane or even humans as what we know as cats because their
minds are operate differently from human minds. Therefore, it
is quite possible that our individual sensible creations are not
entirely similar, but because we have a common method for
identification (language), the sensible creations of individuals
work in concert.
Thus, if humans are active as the cause of the sensible
ideas that they experience, it is possible to satisfy Descartes'
suggestion that it cannot be God who is the cause and
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Berkeley's argument that matter does not exist. Berkeley's
argument is further supported in the case that the entire
existence of God is denied. Berkeley's denial of matter no
longer must make the huge jump from human perception to
divine creation of sensible qualities. He no longer must appeal
to the highest authority for support of his idealism but rather
only to his fellow man.

